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Abstract
Adversarial robustness has emerged as an important
topic in deep learning as carefully crafted attack sam-
ples can significantly disturb the performance of a model.
Many recent methods have proposed to improve adversar-
ial robustness by utilizing adversarial training or model
distillation, which adds additional procedures to model
training. In this paper, we propose a new training
paradigm called Guided Complement Entropy (GCE) that
is capable of achieving “adversarial defense for free,” which
involves no additional procedures in the process of im-
proving adversarial robustness. In addition to maximizing
model probabilities on the ground-truth class like cross-
entropy, we neutralize its probabilities on the incorrect
classes along with a “guided” term to balance between
these two terms. We show in the experiments that our
method achieves better model robustness with even bet-
ter performance compared to the commonly used cross-
entropy training objective. We also show that our method
can be used orthogonal to adversarial training across well-
known methods with noticeable robustness gain. To the
best of our knowledge, our approach is the first one that
improves model robustness without compromising perfor-
mance.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have been adopted to improve
the performance of state-of-the-arts on a wide variety
of tasks in computer vision, including image classifica-
tion [9], segmentation [13], and image generations [6]. Al-
beit triumphing on predictive performance, recent liter-
*The authors contribute equally to this paper.
ature [1, 5, 16] has shown that deep neural models are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In an adversarial at-
tack, undetectable but targeted perturbations are added
to input samples which can drastically degrade the per-
formance of a model. Such attacks have imposed serious
threats to the safety and robustness of technologies en-
abled by deep neural models. Taking deep learning based
self-driving cars, for example, models might mistakenly
recognize a “stop sign” as a “green light” when adversarial
examples are present. Needless to say, improving adver-
sarial robustness is critical as it saves not only the model
performance but the lives of people in many cases.
Figure 1. Latent space of the models trained by different objec-
tive functions on CIFAR10. Visualization is done using t-SNE.
Left: the latent space of model trained with cross-entropy (XE).
Right: the latent space of model trained with GCE. Compared
to XE, more distinct clusters (less overlap) are formed for each
class from the training with GCE.
A wide range of work has been proposed to address the
issue of adversarial robustness. One method to improve
the model robustness is “adversarial training” [11, 14, 20]
where the model is trained with either adversarial ex-
amples [14] or a combination of both natural examples1
1The “natural examples” mentioned in this paper are the normal
samples in the original dataset, which contrasts to the “adversarial ex-
amples.”
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and adversarial examples as a form of data augmenta-
tion [20]. Here, adversarial examples refer to the arti-
ficially samples by adding targeted perturbations to the
original data [1, 4, 5, 10, 14, 16]. Other defense methods
such as Defensive Distillation [17, 18] adopt the concept
of model distillation to teach a smaller version of the orig-
inal learned network that is less sensitive to input pertur-
bations in order to make the model more robust.
One caveat for using the existing defense mechanism is
that they usually require additional processes, relying on
either adversarial training or an additional teacher model
in the distillation case. The fact that such a procedure is
dependent on a specific implementation makes robust-
ness improvement less flexible and more computation-
ally intensive. The question we ask ourselves in this pa-
per is, can we construct a training procedure that is ca-
pable of achieving “adversarial defense for free,” meaning
that model robustness is improved in a model-agnostic
way without the presence of an attack model or a teacher
model. Another issue with the existing methods is that
adversarial robustness usually come at the cost of model
performance. A recent analysis [15, 21] has shown that
adversarial training hurts model generalization, and im-
provement on robustness is approximately at the same
scale as the amount of performance degradation.
In this paper, we propose a novel training paradigm
to improve adversarial robustness that achieves adver-
sarial defense for free without using additional training
procedures. Specifically, we propose a carefully designed
training objective called “Guided Complement Entropy”
(GCE). Different to the usual choice of cross-entropy,
which focuses on optimizing the model’s likelihood on
the correct class, we additionally add penalty that sup-
presses the model’s probabilities on incorrect classes.
Those two terms are balanced through a “guided” term
that scales exponentially. Such a formulation helps to
widen the gap in the manifold between ground-truth
classes and incorrect classes, which has been proved to be
effective in recent studies on minimum adversarial dis-
tortion [23]. This can be illustrated in Fig 1 where GCE
clearly makes the clusters more separable compares to
cross-entropy. Training with GCE for model robustness
has several advantages compares to prior methods: (a) no
additional computational cost is incurred as no adversar-
ial example is involved and no extra model is required,
and (b) contrary to prior analysis [15, 21] , improving
model robustness no longer comes at a cost of model per-
formance and we see sometimes better performance as
supported in our experiment section.
The contributions of our paper are three-fold. Firstly,
to the best of our knowledge, GCE is the first work that
achieves adversarial robustness without compromising
model performance. Compares to the widely used meth-
ods which usually incur significant performance drop,
our method can maintain or even beat the performance of
models trained with cross-entropy. Secondly, our method
is the first approach that is capable of achieving adversar-
ial defense for free, which means improving robustness
does not incur additional training procedures or com-
putational cost, making the method agnostic to attack
mechanisms. Finally, our proposed method managed to
improve on top of a wide range of state-of-the-art defense
mechanisms. Future work in the field can boost robust-
ness improvements across different methods and push
the frontiers of the adversarial defense forward.
2. RelatedWork
Adversarial Attacks. Several adversarial attack methods
have been proposed in the “white-box” setting, which as-
sumes the structure of the model being attacked is known
in advance. As an iteration-based attack, [5] first in-
troduces a fast method to crafting adversarial examples
by perturbing the pixel’s intensity according to the gradi-
ent of the loss function. [5] is an example of the single-
step adversarial attack. As an extension to [5], [10] it-
eratively applies the gradient-based perturbation step by
step, each with a small step size. A further extension to
[10] is [4] which adds gradient-based method with mo-
mentum to boost the success rates of the generated ad-
versarial examples. In addition, an iterative method [16]
has been proposed that uses Jacobian matrices to con-
struct the saliency map for selecting pixels to modify at
each iteration. As an optimization-based attack, the C&W
attack [1] is one of the most powerful attacks using the ob-
jective function to craft adversarial examples to fool the
models.
AdversarialDefenses. Several defense strategies against
adversarial attacks have been proposed to increase the
model’s robustness. In [11], the model’s robustness is en-
hanced by using adversarial training on large scale mod-
els and datasets. [14] formulates the defense of model ro-
bustness as a min-max optimization problem, in which
the adversary is constructed to achieve high loss value
and the model is optimized to minimize the adversar-
ial loss. [20] proposes an ensemble method which in-
corporates perturbed inputs transferred from other mod-
els, and yields model with strong robustness to black-
box attacks. Besides improving the robustness by training
with adversarial examples, Defensive Distillation [17, 18]
is another effective defense approach. The idea is to
generate a “smooth" model which can reduce the sensi-
tivity of the model to the perturbed inputs. In details,
a “teacher" model is proposed with a modified softmax
function with a temperature constant. Then, using the
soft labels produced by the teacher network, a “smooth”
2
model is trained and is found to be more resistant to ad-
versarial examples.
Complement Objective Training. The proposed
Guided Complement Entropy loss takes inspirations
from Complement Objective Training (COT) [2] which
employs not only a primary loss function of cross-
entropy (XE), but also a “complement” loss function to
achieve better generalization. In COT, while the XE loss
was to increase the output weight of the ground-truth
class (and therefore, to learn to predict accurately), the
“complement” loss function was designed with the in-
tention to neutralize the output weights on the incorrect
classes (and therefore facilitates the training process
and improves the final model accuracy). Although
the complement loss function in COT was originally
designed to make the ground-truth class stands out from
the other classes, it has also been shown that the models
trained using COT have achieved good robustness against
single-step adversarial attacks.
Despite the good robustness that COT achieved on
single-step adversarial attacks, the two loss objectives
that COT employs do not have a coordinating mechanism
to efficiently work together to achieve robustness against
stronger attacks, e.g., multiple-step adversarial attacks.
We conjecture that the gradients from the two loss objec-
tives may compete with each other and potentially com-
promise the improvements.
Based on the insight mentioned above, in this work,
we propose GCE as an approach to reconcile the com-
petition between the intentions of COT’s two loss objec-
tives. Rather than letting the two loss objectives work in-
dependently and coordinate merely via the normalization
of output weights, our proposed GCE loss function uni-
fies the core intentions of COT’s two loss objectives, and
explicitly formulates a mechanism to coordinate these
core intentions. We argue that, by eliminating the com-
petitions from COT’s two loss objectives, the intention of
"complement" loss can be maximumly expressed during
the training phase to achieve better robustness.
3. Guided Complement Entropy
In this section, we introduce the proposed Guided
Complement Entropy loss function, and discuss the in-
tuition behind it. We will first review the concept of Com-
plement Entropy [2] before explaining the details of GCE.
Complement Entropy. In [2], the Complement En-
tropy loss was introduced to facilitate the primary cross-
entropy loss during the training process. It was shown
that by introducing the Complement Entropy loss, the
training process can generate models with better predic-
Symbol Meaning
yˆi The predicted probability for the i th sample.
g Index of the ground-truth class.
yi j or yˆi j The j th class (element) of yi or yˆi .
N and K Total number of samples and total number of classes
Table 1. Basic Notations used in this section.
tion accuracy as well as better robustness against single-
step adversarial attacks.
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1, j 6=g
(
yˆi j
1− yˆi g
) log(
yˆi j
1− yˆi g
) (1)
Eq (1) shows the mathematical formula of the Comple-
ment Entropy and notations are summarized in Table 1.
We note that the idea behind the design of Complement
Entropy is to flatten out the weight distribution among
the incorrect classes (“neutralize" the predicted weights
on those classes). Mathematically, a distribution is flat-
tened when its entropy is maximized, so Complement En-
tropy incorporates a negative sign to make it a loss func-
tion to be minimized.
Observing the results reported in [2], we argue that
the improvement on the robustness of the model comes
mostly from the property of the Complement Entropy
on neutralizing the distributional weights on incorrect
classes. Following this thought process, in this work, we
formulate the property of the Complement Entropy ex-
plicitly into a new loss function that (a) is a standalone
training objective with good empirical convergence be-
havior and (b) is explicitly designed to achieve robustness
against various adversarial attacks (including both single-
step and multi-step attacks).
Guided Complement Entropy. Based on our observa-
tions mentioned above, we propose a novel training ob-
jective, Guided Complement Entropy (GCE), which we
will show that accomplishes our two original design goals:
being a standalone training objective, and is inherently
designed for achieving robustness against adversarial at-
tacks. Eq(2) shows the mathematical formula of the pro-
posed GCE:
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
yˆαi g
K∑
j=1, j 6=g
(
yˆi j
1− yˆi g
) log(
yˆi j
1− yˆi g
) (2)
It can be seen that the Eq(2) shares some similarity
with the formula of the Complement Entropy in Eq(1),
specifically the inner summation term, which we will call
it the complement loss factor of the GCE loss. This sim-
ilarity is intended, because it is our goal to make a loss
function that explicitly takes advantage of the property of
complement entropy on defending against adversarial at-
tacks. The main difference is that GCE also introduces a
3
guiding factor of yˆαi g to modulate the effect of the com-
plement loss factor, according to the model’s prediction
quality during the training iterations.
The intuition behind the formula of GCE is that, on
a training instance where the predicted value for the
ground-truth class is low, we consider that the model is
not yet confident to its performance. So, we argue that, at
this instance, it is not strongly required to have the opti-
mizer to optimize eagerly according to the loss value. In-
tuitively, the proposed guiding factor serves as the control
knob that uses the predicted value for the ground-truth
class to modulate the amount of “eagerness” that the op-
timizer should treat the loss value.
Mathematically, on the instance that the model is not
confident (when yˆi g is small), the guiding factor yˆαi g is
also a small value, reducing the impact of the comple-
ment loss factor. On the other hand, as the model grad-
ually improves and assigns larger values to the ground-
truth class, the guiding factor will gradually increase the
impact of the complement loss factor, which will encour-
age the optimizer to become more aggressive on neutral-
izing the weights on the incorrect classes, explicitly train-
ing towards a more robust model against adversarial at-
tacks.
Analysis on thenumber of classes. The value of the pro-
posed GCE loss as defined in Eq(2) depends on the num-
ber of classes, K , of the learning task. When using Eq(2)
directly in a training task, because the dynamic range of
the training loss is different from that of other training
tasks, additional efforts are needed on tuning the learn-
ing schedule for achieving good performance.
Rather than using the GCE loss directly and fine-tuning
the learning schedule for every training task, we mathe-
matically divide the complement loss factor with a nor-
malizing term log(K−1) to make the dynamic range of this
normalized complement loss factor between 0 and -1. We
called the resulting loss function, the normalized Guided
Complement Entropy (Eq(3)), which is defined as
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
yˆαi g ·
1
log(K −1)
K∑
j=1, j 6=g
(
yˆi j
1− yˆi g
) log(
yˆi j
1− yˆi g
) (3)
where K is the number of classes for a training task.
By using the normalized GCE loss, we found that, with-
out the extra effort of tuning the learning schedule, the
optimizing algorithm can converge to a well-performing
model, in terms of both the testing accuracy and the ad-
versarial robustness. Based on this analysis, we conduct
all of our experiments with the normalized Guided Com-
plement Entropy in the following sections when we men-
tion GCE.
Synthetic Data Analysis. To further study the effect of
the guiding factor of the GCE loss, yˆαi g , as well as how the
exponent termα influences the loss function, we visualize
the landscape of the GCE loss of a 3-class distribution and
observe:
1. How does the landscape of GCE loss differ to that of
Complement Entropy loss?
2. How does the α value modify the shape of the loss
landscape of GCE?
3. What are the implications on the convergence be-
havior, given the different loss landscapes of differ-
ent α values?
The synthetic training data we used in this exploratory
study has only three classes, and we set that the class 0 be
the ground-truth label, while the classes 1 and 2 are incor-
rect classes. To visualize the landscape of a loss function
over this 3-class synthetic data, we do a grid-sample over
the weight distributions of the three classes, and plot the
loss value on every sample point.
Fig 2 shows the visualization of the Complement En-
tropy loss function over this synthetic distribution. We
note that for a three-class distribution, the loss function
can be visualized on a 2-D heat map, where the X and Y
coordinates indicate the values of two incorrect classes,
and the heat-value corresponds to the value of the loss
function. The value of the ground-truth class is uniquely
determined by the two incorrect classes, since the three
values have to sum up to 1. Therefore, the origin point (0,
0) is the optimal point, since it is the point where the class
0 (the ground-truth class) gets the full probability value
1. Ideally, in this visualization, the loss values near the
origin should be low, and the loss value increases as we
move away from the origin. In the figure, we also use a
gray shade to indicate the area around the origin where
the output probability on the ground-truth class is larger
than the output probabilities on the two incorrect classes.
This gray-shade area is the region where the model will
output the ground-truth class as its prediction.
In Fig 2(a), although the loss value of Complement En-
tropy is low around the origin, it can be seen that the loss
values of all the points along the line X = Y all have the
equally low loss values. When X = Y , the two incorrect
classes have the same output probability values, and it
can be shown in Eq 1 that the Complement Entropy loss
value along line X = Y is the same. Having a long "valley"
in the loss landscape creates a problem when optimiz-
ing according to the Complement Entropy loss. The loss
function only leads the training to converge to the valley,
but not to the origin (the optimal point).
On the other hand, in Fig 2(b)(c)(d), it can be seen that
the landscape of the GCE loss does not have the prob-
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(a) Complement Entropy (b) GCE with α= 1 (c) GCE with α= 1/3 (d) GCE with α= 1/10
Figure 2. Characteristics of GCE under different α values. Loss values are calculated assuming three classes, with class 0 being the
ground-truth and class 1 & 2 being incorrect classes. The X axis represents the predicted probability of class 1 and the Y axis for class
2. The shaded area (at the bottom left of each sub-figure) represents the prediction being correct (i.e., ground-truth class receives the
predicted probability higher than class 1 or 2). Notice that in (a) and (d) the region of minimal loss (dark blue) does not overlap with
the shaded region, which is not ideal as the loss function couldn’t precisely reflect the prediction being correct. On the other hand,
(b)(c) represent a preferred behavior of a loss function.
Figure 3. The effect of the exponent α of the guiding factor, on
our synthetic 3-class example data. The X-axis is the output
probability of the ground-truth class (class 0), so the optimal
point is at the value 1.0. The output probability of the two in-
correct classes are set to be equal (the optimal condition for the
complement loss factor). The Y-axis is the value of the GCE loss.
Different α values create curves of approaching slopes towards
the optimal point.
lematic "valley" in which the optimization process can be
stuck. By introducing the guiding factor, yˆαi g , in the GCE
loss, the valley along the X = Y line is no longer flat. In-
stead, it is now a valley inclined downwards the origin (the
model’s optimal point). Moreover, the downward slope
of the valley is controlled by the exponent term, α, of the
guiding factor. By comparing the different values of α, it
can be seen that a smallerα value, sayα= 1/10, makes the
loss value drops quickly to a low value, creating a larger
“basin" near the origin.
To further inspect the effect of the exponentα, in Fig. 3,
we plot the profile of the GCE loss function along the line
X = Y , when different α values is used. The X-axis is the
output probability of the ground-truth class, so the value
1.0 is the optimal value. When α= 1, the downward slope
towards the optimal is a constant value. As theα value de-
creases, the downward slope has a bigger and bigger ini-
tial drop, followed by a shallower approach towards the
optimal point. To maintain a good optimization momen-
tum during the entire training process, our intuition is to
prefer an α value that has a reasonable initial drop, but
preserves a good final approach as we get closer to the
optimal point. Therefore, we argue that the preferable α
value should not be too close to 1, nor be too small. In our
experiments in the following section, we will try multiple
values of α and report the results.
4. Adversarial Setting
In the adversarial setting, adversaries apply attack-
ing methods to craft adversarial examples based on the
given natural examples. We consider the white-box at-
tack, which is the most challenging and difficult threat
model for classifiers to defend [1]. White-box adversar-
ial attacks know everything, e.g., parameters, about the
models that they attack on. The ² mentioned below is the
perturbation for the adversarial attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [5] introduced an
efficient one-step attack. The method uses the gradient
evaluated by the training cost function to determine the
direction of the perturbation.The adversarial examples x∗
can be simply generated by :
x∗ = x+² · si g n(OxL(x,y) ) (4)
,where the ² is the perturbation and L(x,y) is the training
loss function.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [10] introduced the ex-
tension of FGSM which applies multiple steps perturba-
tion and clipped the value of features in the constrained
bounding. The BIM formulation is :
x∗0 = x, x∗i = cl i px,²(x∗i−1+
²
r
· si g n(Ox∗i−1 L(x
∗
i−1,y) ) ) (5)
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where the r is the number of iterations and clipx,²(·) is
the clipping function to keep the value of features being
bounded.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [14] proposed a
more powerful adversary method which is the multi-step
variant FGSMk. The process of crafting the adversarial ex-
amples in PGD is similar to BIM. The difference is that the
x∗0 is a uniformly random point in `∞-ball around x.
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [4] integrated the
momentum property into the iterative gradient-based at-
tack to craft the adversarial examples. The method not
only stabilize the update directions during the iterative
process but also improve the situation about sticking in
the local maximum in BIM. The MIM formulation is:
gt =µ ·gt−1+
OxL(x∗t−1,y)
‖OxL(x∗t−1,y)‖1
(6)
x∗t = cl i px,²(x∗t−1+
²
r
· si g n(gt ) ) (7)
where gt is the gradient which accumulating the velocity
vector in the direction and µ is the decay factor.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [16] pro-
posed the powerful target attack which can just perturb
fewer pixels. The method identify the features that can
significantly affect output classification by the evaluation
of the saliency map. Through modifying the input fea-
tures iterative, JSMA craft the adversarial example which
cause the model misclassified in specific targets.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W) [1] introduce a optimization-
based attack and can effective defeat defensive distilla-
tion [1]. To ensure the perturbation for images is avail-
able, the method defines the box constraints to make the
pixels value in a constrained bounding. They define:
x∗ = 1
2
( tanh(w) +1) (8)
in terms of w and let 0≤ x∗ ≤ 1 to make the sample is valid
and optimize w with the formulation:
min
w
‖1
2
( tanh(w) +1) −x‖22+ c · f (
1
2
( tanh(w) +1)) (9)
where c is the constant. The f ( ·) is the objective function
f (x) =max(max{Zpre(x)i : i 6= y}−Zpre(x)i,−κ) (10)
where the κ is the confidence and Zpre(x)i is the model
output logits.
5. Experiments
We conduct experiments to demonstrate that:
1. Models trained with GCE can achieve better classifi-
cation performance, compared to the baseline mod-
els trained using the XE loss function.
2. In addition to achieving good classification perfor-
mance on the natural, non-adversarial examples, the
models trained with GCE are also robust against sev-
eral kinds of "white-box" adversarial attacks.
3. In the setting of "adversarial training", we show that
substituting the GCE loss function in the PGD adver-
sarial training, the resulting models are more robust
than the previous results.
5.1. Performance on natural examples
In this section, we give experimental results show-
ing that models trained using GCE, in the natural, non-
adversarial setting, can outperform the previously re-
ported best models trained using XE. Specifically, we
compared the model accuracy on several image classifica-
tion datasets of different scales, ranging from MNIST [12],
CIFAR10, CIFAR100 [8] and Tiny ImageNet2.
In our experiments, for each data set, we take the best
model previously published (the baseline model), and
substitute the loss function from the original XE to the
proposed GCE. For MNIST, we use the model Lenet-5 [12]
with Adam Optimizer. For CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, we use
ResNet-56 [7]; while for Tiny ImageNet, it is trained with
ResNet-50. The ResNet-56 and ResNet-50 models were
trained following the standard settings described in [7].
In details, the models were trained using SGD optimizer
with momentum of 0.9, and weight decay is set to be
0.0001. The learning rate is set to start at 0.1, then is di-
vided by 10 at the 100th and 150th epochs.
Table 2 compares the classification error rates of the
baseline models and those of GCE’s models. We found
that the performance achieved by GCE’s models are usu-
ally as good or outperforming the models from XE, when
the guided factor, controlled by α, is appropriately cho-
sen. For example, on Tiny ImageNet, our proposed model
achieves 38.56% error rate, atα= 1/3, which is better than
the 39.54% error rate of the baseline model.
5.2. Robustness to White-box attacks
The main motivation of the proposed GCE loss, is to
train models that are robust to adversarial attacks. In this
section, we took the models that were trained above as de-
scribed in Sec. 5.1, and evaluated their robustness against
2https://tiny-imagenet.herokuapp.com, a subset of Ima-
geNet [3]
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Dataset MNIST CIFAR10 CIFAR100 Tiny ImageNet
Architecture LeNet-5 ResNet-56 ResNet-50
Baseline 0.8 7.99 31.9 39.54
α= 1/2 0.61 9.18 40.59 43.36
α= 1/3 0.67 7.18 31.75 38.56
α= 1/4 0.64 6.93 31.8 38.69
α= 1/5 0.68 6.91 31.48 38.26
Table 2. Classification error rates (%) of the baseline models (us-
ing XE) and the proposed models, evaluated on 4 image classi-
fication data sets. The α is the guided factor of the proposed
model.
the six kinds of white-box attack (described in Sec. 4). In
the experiments of this section, we set the exponent of the
guiding factor α= 1/3.
Robustness. We first evaluated the robustness of our
proposed models on the two smaller data sets, MNIST
and CIFAR10. Following the preprocessing that is com-
mon in previous work, the pixel values in both data sets
were scaled to the interval [0,1]. For the iteration-based
attacks using gradients, e.g., FGSM, BIM, PGD and MIM,
we crafted adversarial examples in the non-targeted way,
with respect to the perturbation ². The iterations are set
to be 10 for BIM, and 40 for both PGD and MIM. For
the iteration-based attack using Jacobian matrix, JSMA,
the adversarial examples were perturbed with the sev-
eral values of γ (the maximum percentage of pixels per-
turbed in each image), and the perturbation ²=1. For the
optimization-based attack, C&W, we perform the targeted
attack using the "average case" approach, as mentioned
in the original paper [1]. Regarding the parameters of the
C&W attack, we set binary steps to be 9 and the maximum
iterations to be 1000. The initial constant is set to 0.001
and the confidence is set to 0.
Table 3 shows the results of the attacks mentioned
above. The models trained with GCE always have higher
classification accuracy than the baseline models trained
with XE, under the six white-box adversarial attacks, on
both datasets. In particular, the best accuracy improve-
ment between our models and the baseline is on the Mo-
mentum Iterative Method (MIM) attack.
For large-scale datasets, i.e., CIFAR100 and Tiny Ima-
geNet, we evaluated the robustness of our models on the
PGD attack, which is the most powerful white-box adver-
sarial attack. Table 4 compares the classification accuracy
of our models and that of the baseline models. Our mod-
els, under the PGD attack, outperform the baseline mod-
els on classification accuracy.
Robustness compared to COT. For evaluating the ad-
versarial robustness about COT and GCE, we conduct var-
ious white-box attacks on the models trained with COT
Attacks
MNIST CIFAR10
Param. XE GCE Param. XE GCE
FGSM
²= 0.1
²= 0.2
²= 0.3
78.32
38.88
14.99
87.66
62.74
47.21
²= 0.04
²= 0.12
²= 0.2
14.76
9.58
8.78
41.22
14.82
11.81
BIM
²= 0.1
²= 0.2
²= 0.3
53.14
2.15
0.01
61.92
34.49
33.45
²= 0.04
²= 0.12
²= 0.2
0.25
0.0
0.0
19.59
3.03
1.97
PGD
²= 0.1
²= 0.2
²= 0.3
46.85
1.58
0.0
51.85
9.55
2.22
²= 0.04
²= 0.12
²= 0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.91
1.89
1.66
MIM
²= 0.1
²= 0.2
²= 0.3
48.28
2.29
0.01
61.18
39.81
38.78
²= 0.04
²= 0.12
²= 0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
15.44
13.1
12.69
JSMA
γ= 0.25
γ= 0.5
1.53
0.1
26.24
17.26
γ= 0.07
γ= 0.14
1.09
0.14
18.72
10.94
C&W c = 0. 0.0 25.6 c = 0. 0.0 0.8
Table 3. Performance (%) on white-box adversarial attacks with
wide range of perturbations. The model for MNIST is Lenet-5
and CIFAR10 is Resnet-56. For FGSM, BIM, PGD and MIM, we
select three perturbations, ² = 0.04, 0.12 and 0.2 in our exper-
iment. In JSMA, we set the perturbation ² = 1. and maximum
iterations to be 100 and 200, which means the maximum pixels
that JSMA purturbs in each image. We show the max iteration
which is transformed to percentage of maximum pixels modi-
fied γ in our experiment. In C&W, we set confidence c = 0. and
maximum iterations is 1000.
Attacks
CIFAR100 Tiny ImageNet
Parameter XE GCE Parameter XE GCE
PGD
²= 0.04
²= 0.12
²= 0.2
0.04
0.0
0.0
2.94
0.46
0.19
²= 0.04
²= 0.12
²= 0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.52
4.27
1.11
Table 4. Performance (%) on white-box adversarial attacks with
wide range of perturbations in CIFAR100. The model of CI-
FAR100 and Tiny ImageNet is Resnet-56.
and GCE with different perturbations in MNIST and CI-
FAR10. In Table 5, we show that the accuracy of various
adversarial attacks trained with GCE outperforms COT.
Attacks
MNIST CIFAR 10
Param. XE COT GCE Param. XE COT GCE
FGSM ² = 0.2 38.88 51.8 62.74 ² = 0.04 14.76 33.62 41.22
BIM ² = 0.2 2.15 4.35 34.49 ² = 0.04 0.25 7.49 19.59
MIM ² = 0.2 2.29 4.26 39.81 ² = 0.04 0.0 0.0 15.44
JSMA γ = 0.25 1.53 11.13 26.24 γ = 0.07 1.09 8.25 18.72
C&W c = 0 0.0 11.9 25.6 c = 0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Table 5. Performance (%) under various white-box adversarial
attacks between COT and GCE across MNIST and CIFAR10.
5.3. Robustness to adversarial training
The idea of adversarial training is to include adversar-
ial examples in the training phase, to create models that
are robust to other adversarial examples during the test
phase. Several frameworks of adversarial training have
been proposed. In this work, we choose to integrate our
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proposed GCE loss function in the Projected Gradient De-
scent (PGD) adversarial training, since the PGD attack is
considered an universal one, among all of the first-order
adversarial attacks [14]. We show that the resulting mod-
els from this integration are more robust than the ones
trained using the original PGD approach.
The PGD adversarial training uses a min-max objective
function to accomplish adversarial training:
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ)= E
x,y∼D
[max
δ
L(θ, x+δ, y)]. (11)
, where D is the data distribution over pairs of training
sample x and label y. The loss function L(·) is the XE loss.
In Eq(11), the inner maximization problem is for crafting
training adversarial examples to induce maximum loss
values, while the outer minimization problem is for build-
ing a classification model, ρ(·), to minimize the adversar-
ial loss by the universal adversary. One typical approach
for optimizing this min-max objective is through an itera-
tive algorithm.
In the original work, the loss function for the inner
maximization and that for the outer minimization are the
same, which is the XE loss. In our work, we keep the loss
function for the inner maximization intact as the XE loss,
because it has been proved that the PGD framework gen-
erates the optimal adversarial examples, among all first-
order adversarial attacks, when using the XE loss. On the
other hand, for the outer minimization, that is, the train-
ing of the classification model, we replace the XE loss with
our proposed GCE loss. This way of integration is similar
to other previous work [19] that also keeps the XE as the
loss function of the inner maximization problem.
In our setup, we use GCE (α= 1/3) as the loss function
for the Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) [22] instead of
original XE in Eq(11). Then, to compare the robustness
of the models generated using our setup, with the mod-
els trained using the original setup, we attack both these
models using the PGD white-box (with respect to the XE
loss) adversarial attack.
In our experiments, the minimization models we used
are the baseline models as described in the previous
sections, i.e., LeNet or Resnet, for their corresponding
datasets. Table 6 shows the comparison results on MNIST
and CIFAR10 datasets. More specifically, in our experi-
ments, we use the same settings of the iterative optimiza-
tion as used in the previous work [14], to conduct the ad-
versarial training and adversarial attacks: on MNIST, we
do 40 iterations of crafting adversarial examples during
training; at the testing phase, 100 iterations are used to
apply the PGD attack. On CIFAR10, 10 iterations of ad-
versarial training are used, and the adversarial attacks are
conducted with 40 iterations. We demonstrate better ro-
bustness while using GCE loss for the outer minimization.
Attacks
MNIST CIFAR10
perturbation XE GCE perturbation XE GCE
PGD ²= 0.3 83.67 83.85 ²= 0.04
²= 0.08
41.50
12.93
41.57
13.16
Table 6. Performance (%) of Adversarial training under PGD ad-
versarial attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10.
Latent space of adversarial trainedmodels. We also in-
spect the latent spaces of GCE’s models trained with PGD
adversarial training, and find that they have similar char-
acteristics of the latent spaces of the GCE’s models from
the natural training3 procedure. For example, in Fig 4, we
visualize the latent space of our model trained on the CI-
FAR10 dataset. It can be seen that, despite the presence
of many adversarial training examples, our model is still
able to disperse examples of different classes and create
visually better separated clusters.
Figure 4. Latent spaces of the adversarial-trained models on CI-
FAR10: (Left) latent space of XE’s model; (Right) latent space of
GCE’s model. The adversarial training is done using PGD with
²= 0.02. Visualization is done using t-SNE.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the Gudied Complement
Entropy (GCE), a novel training objective to answer the
motivational question: “how to improve the model robust-
ness, and at the same time, keep or improve the perfor-
mance when no attack is present?” GCE encourages mod-
els to learn latent representation that groups samples of
the same class into distinct clusters. Experimental results
show that, under the normal condition (no adversarial at-
tack is present), the state-of-the-art models trained with
GCE achieves better accuracy compared to cross-entropy
by up to relative 10.14% on CIFAR-10. When adversarial
attacks are present, experimental results show that mod-
els trained with GCE are more robust compared to XE.
Under PGD attacks, GCE outperforms the baseline with
improvement up to 5.91%. Our experimental results also
confirm that GCE can be combined with PGD adversarial
training to achieve an even stronger robustness.
3We use "natural training" to refer to the training process using only
the natural examples in the original dataset, in contrast to adversarial
training that takes adversarial examples during training.
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